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IV

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The first issue for the Court to determine is whether the trial court' s failure to consider the
ability of the payor spouse to provide support constitutes an abuse of discretion. The standard of
appellate review is that the appellate court will not reverse the trial court unless there exists a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).
The second issue for the Court to decide is whether the trial court's failure to enter sufficient
findings on the ability of the payor spouse to provide support constitutes an abuse of discretion. The
standard of appellate review is that the trial court will not be overturned unless there is a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).
The third issue for the Court to decide is whether the trial court erred when the trial court
calculated Appellant's current income at a level equal to a ten percent reduction of Appellant's
average income from the years 1992-1995 notwithstanding the fact that Appellant presented clear and
convincing evidence that his actual current income is significantly lower than the $460,903.00 amount
and the fact that neither party presented evidence tending to validate the trial court' s conclusion that
Appellant currently makes ninety percent of his past income. The standard of appellate review is that
the trial court's finding of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Pgtgrson v. Peterson,
818 P.2d 1305, 1307-08 (Utah App. 1991).
The fourth issue for the Court to decide is whether the trial court's failure to enter sufficient
findings as to how the trial court concluded that Appellant's current income is ninety percent of his
past average income constitutes an abuse of discretion. The standard of review is that the appellate
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court will not reverse the trial court unless there is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v.
Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).
The fifth issue for the Court to determine is whether the trial court erred by only imputing
$1,000.00 per month until May of 1998 when the clear weight of evidence demonstrated that the Court
should have imputed $2,500.00 per month beginning from the time of trial. The standard of appellate
review is that the trial court's findings of fact will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.
Peterson v. Peterson. 818 P.2d 1305, 1307-08 (Utah App. 1991).
The sixth issue for the Court to determine is whether the trial court erred by ordering a
retroactive modification of the temporary alimony even though Appellant had already made a timely
payment of the debt as it became due. The standard of appellate review is that the appellate court will
not reverse the trial court unless there is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel,
732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY LAW
"The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: (I) the financial
condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce
income; (iii)the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and (iv) the length of the marriage.
Utah Code Ann., § 30-3-5 (7)(a).
"Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing
is held and afindingmade that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or under-employed." Utah Code
Ann.. § 78-45-7.5 (7)(a).
"If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable
earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons
of similar backgrounds in the community." Utah Code Ann., § 78-45-7.5 (7)(b).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
The parties in this matter were married on March 19, 1975. This case is an appeal from a
decree of divorce granted to Appellee on June 3, 1997. In essence, this case centers on whether the
trial court' s failure to consider evidence which clearly tends to show that Appellant currently makes
well below the income levels which the court attributes to him constitutes an abuse of discretion. Since
income and ability to pay support are inextricably connected, Appellant maintains that the court' s
failure to consider such evidence violates the mandate of Utah Code Ann., § 30-3-5 (7)(a) wherein the
trial judge must consider the ability of the payor spouse to provide support.
B. Course of Proceedings
Appellee filed a Complaint for Divorce on March 6, 1995. On April 21, 1995, the parties
entered into a Stipulation governing temporary matters whereby Appellant agreed to pay $6,500.00 per
month to Appellee for temporary alimony. Appellant also agreed to pay $1,500.00 a month to
Appellee for child support bringing the total monthly amount paid to Appellee to $8,000.00. Trial in
this matter was set for May 2, and May 3, 1996, in the First District Court before the Honorable Clint
S. Judkins.
At the time of trial, counsel informed the court that the parties would limit the issues to
alimony, property division and attorney s fees. With regard to the issue of alimony, the parties
specifically disputed the amount of money earned by Appellant and the amount of money imputed to
Appellee. During trial, both parties produced witnesses and submitted exhibits to the Court. On May
7, 1996, the Court issued its ruling.
Notwithstanding an abundance of evidence to the contrary, the trial court determined that
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Appellant earned $512,114.00 per annum based on the average of his earnings for 1992-1995. In
reaching this figure, the trial court refused to consider evidence of Appellant' s income from the first
four months of 1996 which reflected the new area hospital contracts. The trial court also refused to
consider the undisputed fact that Appellant's unusually high 1994 income simply reflected the fact that
one his partners had not worked during the 1994 year and that Appellant had worked an inordinate
amount of overtime to compensate for this absence. Rather, the trial court simply and arbitrarily
anticipated that Appellant's 1996 earnings would decrease by ten percent (10%) leaving him with an
income of $460,903.00 from which to calculate alimony.
After child support and taxes, the trial court concluded that Appellant's income totaled
approximately $22,029.00 per month. From this total the trial court awarded Appellee alimony in the
amount of $11,015.00 per month. The total monthly amount awarded to Appellee was $12,415.00. In
reaching this amount the trial court imputed $1,000.00 a month to Appellee. The trial court concluded,
however, that inasmuch as Appellee could earn her teaching certificate in as little as two quarters, this
imputed amount would increase to $2,500.00 in May of 1998. Correspondingly, the trial court
reduced the alimony award by $1,500.00 at this time.
Following the May 1996, trial, the Court required both parties to re-brief the case. In
November of 1996, the court heard additional argument in this matter. After hearing additional
argument regarding the tax consequences of the Court' s previous ruling, the Court reduced
Appellant's alimony obligations by $500.00. The trial court refused, however, to consider current
evidence regarding Appellant's present income.
The Final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared by Appellee over the
objection of Appellant and were entered by the trial court on June 3, 1997. The final Decree of
Divorce was entered on June 3, 1997.
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C. Disposition in the Trial Court
The trial court concluded that, based on an average of Appellant's income from 1992-1995,
that Appellant earned $460,903.00 per annum. From this amount the trial court awarded Appellee
$11,015.00 per month as alimony. Following a re-hearing on the issue to consider tax consequences,
the trial court reduced this amount to $10,515.00. The Court ordered Appellant to pay this amount
retroactively to the date of the trial. The trial court also ordered Appellant to pay Appellee an
additional $1,400.00 per month in child support.
The trial court further divided the marital estate. Pursuant to this division, the trial court
awarded to Appellee the Logan home and furnishings, the Central Life account, two Jackson National
accounts, a Suburban automobile, and a one-half interest in the VEBA, RANCON and Genesis general
partnership. The trial court found the value of this portion of the estate to equal $326,215.00. The
trial court awarded to Appellant the Providence home and furnishings, a recreational four-wheeler, a
Blazer automobile, five Jackson National accounts, a Central Life account, Lord Abbot, IDEX,
Oppenheimer, ATEL, and a one-half interest in the VEBA and RANCON accounts and a one-half
interest in the Genesis general partnership. The trial court found the value of this estate to equal
$221,469.00.
To equalize the division of the property, the court ordered Appellee to pay Appellant the sum
of $57,953.50. To satisfy this judgment, the court allowed Appellant to offset this amount owed
against the arrearages which had accumulated in Appellant' s alimony from the date of the trial until the
date of the decree. The court then allowed Appellant to reduce his alimony payment by $1,000.00 per
month until Appellee retired the debt owed to Appellant.
The Court ordered each party to bear their own attorney's fees by finding that the amount of
Appellee's alimony and property award were sufficient to pay such a fee. The court upheld the parties'
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stipulations with regards to the remaining issues of the divorce.
D. Statement of the Facts
1. The parties were married on March 19, 1975. During the course of this marriage three
children were born, two of whom remain minors. (R. at 65).
2. On March 6, 1995, Appellee filed a Complaint for Divorce. (R. at 357).
3. On April 21, 1995, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby the parties agreed that
Appellant would pay the total of $8,000.00 to Appellee in support with $6,500.00 of this sum allocated
to alimony and $1,500.00 allocated to child support. At a subsequent Pre-Trial Conference held on
March 26, 1996, the parties affirmed this stipulation. (R. at 2-6).
4. Trial on this matter was held on May 2 and 3, 1996. The parties reserved three issues for
resolution at trial: alimony, property division and attorney's fees. (R. at 7).
5. During trial, Appellant presented extensive testimony regarding his present level of income.
(R. At 443).
6. Ruth Ann Finch, an assistant administrator at Western Surgery, testified that medical
insurance companies had recently expanded the practice of discounting the rates for which they would
pay doctors for the procedures which they perform. (R. at 167). Ms. Finch gave the specific example
that a knee surgery performed in 1993 which paid the Appellant $1,211.00 would only pay $773.36 in
1996. (R. At 169-70). Ms. Finch attributed this reduction to insurance company discounting.
Appellee did not offer evidence to rebut this testimony. Ms. Finch further testified that Appellant
derived 75% of his business from insurance contracts. (R. At 181).
7. Ms. Finch also testified that 1994 represented an unusually high departure from Appellant' s
average income. (R. At 178). Ms. Finch attributed this departure to the fact that one of Appellant's
partners took an extensive sabbatical in 1994 which created an opportunity for Appellant to perform the
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surgeries which his partner would have performed. (R. At 178). Appellee did not offer evidence to
rebut this testimony.
8. Ms. Finch testified that another doctor at Western Surgery currently made 35% less in 1996
as compared with previous years due to changes in the medical climate in Cache Valley. ( R. At 180).
Appellee did not offer evidence to rebut his testimony.
9. Rusty Shelton, the CEO of Western Surgery, offered testimony showing that four new
surgeons had signed contracts to enter the already saturated orthopedic surgeon market in Cache Valley
in 1995 and 1996. (R. At 220). Mr. Shelton testified that this increase would immediately have a
negative impact on Appellant's current salary. (R. At 220).
10. Mr. Shelton, after concluding extensive national research on the subject, also testified that
as the managed care and third party payors penetrated the Cache valley market that physicians in Cache
Valley could expect to earn as much as 35% less in the future. (R. At 225). Appellee failed to
introduce any evidence to show that national trends would not affect Cache Valley economies.
11. Richard Dorigatti, the CPA for Western Surgery and the physicians therein, testified that
Appellant had earned $100,398.00 during the first four months of 1996. Projected out over the
remainder of the year, Mr. Dorigatti calculated that Appellant would earn $330,631.00 as a total for
1996. (R. At 254).
12. Troy Martin, another CPA employed by Western Surgery, testified that, unlike scenarios
which present in other closely held corporations, Appellant could not artificially manipulate his income
downward inasmuch as the administrators at Western Surgery controlled Appellant's billing as opposed
to Appellant himself. (R. At 352-53).
13. Appellee's own witness, Paul Simpkins, testified that he had failed to review Appellant's 1996
records to determine Appellant's current income despite the fact that such records were available for
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review. (R. At 107). Mr. Simpkins further conceded that the most accurate method to determine
Appellant' s present income would be to take into consideration his 1996 income. (R. At 108).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah law mandates that a trial judge must consider the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support when calculating the amount of alimony awarded to the receiving spouse. Failure to make such
a consideration constitutes an abuse of discretion which the appellate court must reverse. When
factoring in the payor spouse's ability to pay, the Court must consider his present ability as opposed to
his historical ability to pay such an award inasmuch as the award will be paid from present as opposed
to historical income.
Following trial, the trial court failed to prepare adequate findings of fact. Utah law requires
the Court to prepare adequate factual findings on all material issues necessary to support an award of
alimony. The trial court's failure to make specific findings of fact with regard to Appellant's ability
to provide support constitutes an error which the appellate court must rectify by overturning the award
and remanding the matter.
ARGUMENT
I. TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT APPELLANT EARNS $460,903.00 PER YEAR IS
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS INASMUCH AS THIS FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
The appellate court reviews the trial court' sfindingsof fact under the clearly erroneous
standard. Cummings v. Cummings. 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991). This standard requires the
Appellant to show that such findings are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Saunders
v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991). To meet this burden, Appellant must marshall all of the evidence
supporting the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
Court's decision below. Id.
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In the Final Findings of Fact, paragraph 32, the trial court found:
It is likely Defendant's income will be lower in 1996 and thereafter than the four year average
determined by the Court. The Court finds that ten percent (10%) is an appropriate amount to
reduce the average income, which is approximately $51,211.00. The Court, therefore, finds
that Defendant's current income is $460,903.00 per year or $38,408.00 per month.
Appellant must now marshall all of the evidence presented in trial which supports this finding that
Appellant currently makes $460,903.00 and then demonstrate that such evidence is legally insufficient
to support such a finding. In the instant case, Appellant's task is compounded by the fact that the trial
court failed to prepare adequate findings of fact relative to how the trial court arrived at ten percent as
the Appropriate amount" to reduce Appellant's historical income.
In arriving at the $460,903.00 figure, the trial court makes two errors not supported by
substantial evidence: 1) Relying on Appellant's historical income as an accurate gauge by which to
measure Appellant's current income; and 2) Arbitrarily assigning the figure often percent as an
accurate measure of Appellant's reduction in income.
A. APPELLANTS HISTORICAL INCOME DOES NOT ACCURATELY PREDICT
APPELLANTS PRESENT INCOME.
With respect to the first issue, Appellant concedes that Appellee produced sufficient evidence at
trial from which the Court could adduce that Appellant averaged $512,114.00 per year from the time
period 1992-1995. This fact notwithstanding, Appellee did not produce legally sufficient evidence to
allow the Court to use this average as a true reflection of Appellant's current income when measured
against the substantial evidence to the contrary.
In making the decision to use the average of 1992-1995 and exclude evidence from the first four
months of 1996, the Court stated that "a four month duration is too short a time to determine any
reliability, that it is not reflective of Defendant's actual income, and that a four year average is more
appropriate to determine current income." (Findings of Fact at paragraph 30). This sentiment echoes
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the testimony of witness Paul Simpkins who opined that a four month period was too short to determine
Appellant' s income given the fluctuations which existed in Appellant' s month to month income. (R.
At 325-26).
The Court's decision to exclude 1996 records and rely solely on the four year average,
however, does not conform to the overwhelming bulk of testimony presented to the contrary. In fact,
Appellee's own witness, Paul Simpkins, upon whom the Court apparently relied in making its finding,
conceded during cross-examination that the best indication of Appellant's current income has to take
into consideration the 1996 income. (R. At 108). In addition, Appellant's witnesses, Ruth Ann Finch,
Richard Dorigatti and Rusty Shelton, all testified that a four year average from 1992-1995 would not
give an accurate measure of Appellant's income. In reaching this conclusion, the witnesses cited two
controlling facts: 1) 1994 was an aberrant year for earnings; and 2) the medical climate no longer
fostered the types of income historically seen.
i. When calculating income, trial court may not rely upon overtime which is inconsistent
and speculative.
When a court calculates a payor spouse's income for purposes of determining an alimony
award, overtime income may be used only if the overtime has been consistent and the calculation of
overtime is not speculative. Crompton v. Crompton. 888 P.2d 686 (Utah App. 1994). In calculating
Appellant's income, the trial court erred by including figures from 1994. The clear weight of
testimony presented at trial tended to show that Appellant earned significantly more during 1994 than
he had earned before or since. The testimony conclusively demonstrated that this increase resulted
from the overtime which Appellant worked during this year.
Ms. Finch testified that during 1994, Appellant had the opportunity to increase his earnings by
filling in for a partner who had taken a six month sabbatical. (R. At 178). During this period of time,
Appellant performed more procedures and subsequently earned more money than he ever had
10

previously or has since. (R. At 178). When the partner returned, Appellant's opportunities to
perform additional procedures decreased. Appellee did not offer evidence to rebut this testimony,
rather, Mr. Simpkins conceded that Appellant's revenue increased dramatically in 1994. (R. At 95).
Mr. Simpkins also admitted that Appellant's income fell in 1995 following the return of the absent
doctor. (R. At 96).
For purposes of calculating alimony, this increase in 1994 can only be attributed to the
overtime which Appellant worked during his partner's sabbatical. Since this doctor's return,
Appellant did not have the opportunity to work consistent overtime. Since the overtime was not
consistent, the trial court's inclusion of 1994 for purposes of calculating income is an error under
Crompton.
ii. The overwhelming weight of evidence demonstrated that changes in health care caused
lower incomes for doctors.
Ms. Finch, Mr. Shelton and Mr. Dorigatti each testified that the medical economy in Cache
Valley no longer supported the amounts of income historically seen. Ms. Finch testified that the
practice of insurance companies paying discounted rates for procedures increased during the period
1992-1996. (R. At 167). As such, a surgery which paid $1,211.00 in 1993 only paid $773.36 in
1995. (R. At 169-70). Ms. Finch testified that seventy-five percent of Appellant's practice stemmed
from insurance contracts. (R. At 181). Appellee did not offer testimony to refute this testimony,
rather, Mr. Simpkins acknowledged that insurance discounts had recently increased. (R. At 124).
Mr. Shelton testified that national health management trends had begun to affect Cache Valley
in 1995 and 1996. (R. At 245). As a result of these trends, physicians could realistically expect to
earn thirty-five percent less in 1996 than in the previous years. (R. At 225). Ms. Finch testified that
another doctor employed at Western Surgery made thirty-five percent less in 1996 than he did in 1995.
(R. At 180). Mr. Shelton also testified to the fact that four additional surgeons were under contract in
11

1996 than in 1994. The addition of these four surgeons would only decrease the amount of money
which Appellant earned and make the historical average less reliable. (R. At 220). Mr. Dorigatti
testified that Appellant' s revenues for 1996 were significantly lower in 1996 when compared to
previous years. (R. At 244). When projected over a twelve month period, Mr. Dorigatti estimated
that Appellant would earn $330,631.00 for the 1996 year. (R. At 254). Appellee did not offer
testimony regarding any changes in the medical economy in Cache Valley.
In short, witnesses for both Appellant and Appellee stated that the trial court should at least
consider 1996 revenue when determining Appellant' s current income. In addition, Appellant produced
an overwhelming amount of unrefuted testimony tending to show that Appellant's historical average
did not accurately reflect Appellant's present income. At the very least, the trial court's failure to
consider 1996 revenue leads to a clearly erroneous finding not supported by substantial evidence. The
substantial bulk of testimony, however, demonstrated that any reliance on Appellant's historical
average could only lead to an erroneous finding.
B. TRIAL COURTS TEN PERCENT REDUCTION IN INCOME IS ARBITRARY AND
NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
With regard to the second issue, Appellant's task of marshaling evidence which supports the
trial court' s finding is compounded by the trial court's failure to prepare adequate Findings of Fact.
In the Findings of Fact, the Court states that "ten percent is an appropriate amount to reduce the
average income." The Court, however, neglects to inform the parties exactly how the court determined
that ten percent became the appropriate number.
During trial, several witnesses gave testimony regarding Appellant's ability to earn income.
Mr. Simpkins provided the court with a four year historical average of Appellant's earnings and
concluded that Appellant showed an overall increase in his net average from 1992 to 1995. (R. At 96).
Ms. Finch testified that physicians at Western Surgery were all making much less in 1996 when
12

compared to previous years. (R. At 180). In particular, one doctor at Western Surgery was making
thirty-five percent less in 1996 than he had in previous years. (R. At 180). Mr. Shelton confirmed that
orthopedic surgeons in Utah could expect to earn thirty-five percent less than they had made
historically. (R. At 225). Appellee did not offer testimony refuting the fact that physicians at Western
Surgery made less in 1996 than they had made previously. Rather, Mr. Simpkins conceded that he had
undertaken no independent analysis of Western Surgery or the Cache Valley medical economy. (R. At
92, 343).
Other testimony offered during trial isolated the cause of the decrease in revenue. Ms. Finch
attributed part of the decrease to insurance discounting. (R. At 167). Another part she attributed to the
addition of new doctors. (R. At 179). Mr. Shelton traced a portion of the decrease to reduced
Medicare payments. (R. At 231). Still another, he attributed to managed health care programs. (R. At
225). The witnesses each assigned different percentages to the decreases they listed. Without knowing
more, Appellant cannot guess as to which number the Court decided to use to arrive at the ten percent
reduction the Court employed.
What is certain, however, is that Appellant's witnesses looked at hard data in determining that
Appellant's 1996 income was lower than previous years. Mr. Dorigatti presented receipts from the
first four months of 1996. This data showed that Appellant earned $100,398.00 for the first four
months of 1996. (R. At 254). Appellee presented no competent or substantial evidence which showed
that Appellant earned more than this figure. When projected over a twelve month period, Mr.
Dorigatti estimated that Appellant would earn $330,631.00 during 1996. (R. At 254). The Court will
note that in arriving at this conclusion, Mr. Dorigatti did more than simply multiply the revenues from
the first four months by three. Rather, this figure represents the best professional estimate which Mr.
Dorigatti could form when presented with all available data.
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In arriving at its ten percent reduction figure for 1996, the trial court did not rely on any
evidence regarding 1996 presented by Appellee. Mr. Simpkins, Appellee's only financial expert,
acknowledged that he had opted not to review any 1996 data even though such data was available. (R.
At 107-08). It is particularly worth noting that Mr. Simpkins makes this acknowledgment while
conceding that the best indication of Appellant' s current income would have to consider 1996 revenue.
(R. At 108). But, since Appellee offered no competent or substantial evidence regarding 1996
income, the Court could not rely upon such when arriving at the ten percent figure.
Rather, it appears the Court accepted the premise that Appellant would make less in 1996 and
thereafter when compared to his historical income. Instead of relying on the unrefiited data which Mr.
Dorigatti presented, however, the trial court apparently arbitrarily designated ten percent as the number
by which to reduce Appellant's historical income. Inasmuch as the overwhelming bulk of the
testimony presented at trial does not support this finding, thisfindingis clearly erroneous.
II. TRIAL COURTS FAILURE TO CONSIDER PAYOR SPOUSES ABILITY TO
PROVIDE SUPPORT CONSTITUTES ERROR.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (7)(a) provides: "The court shall consider at least the following factors in
determining alimony: (i) the financial conditions and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient' s
earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
and (iv) the length of the marriage." The third factor requires the Court to make a determination as to
the ability of Appellant to provide support to Appellee. This inquiry typically requires the trial court to
ascertain the payor spouse's income. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). The Court of
Appeals has stated unequivocally that a "[fjailure to analyze the parties' circumstances in light of these
three factors constitutes an abuse of discretion." Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).
Merely establishing an arbitrary income figure not supported by the evidence, however, will not
suffice.
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As outlined above, in determining Appellant' s income the trial court simply subtracted ten
percent from Appellant's historical income averaged from 1992-1995. In so doing, the Court made
two erroneous assumptions: 1) That the historical average accurately evidenced Appellant' s current
income; and 2) That the ten percent figure accurately reflected Appellant's actual decrease in income.
Not only does this assumption lead to a clearly erroneous finding, however, this approach does not
comply with statutory mandates.
Utah courts have consistently held that a trial court may only rely on historical evidence of
income as an accurate measure of ability when a party experiences a temporary decrease in income.
As this Court stated in Cox v. Cox. 877 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Utah App. 1994), "In assessing spousal
support, trial courts have appropriately relied on historical income rather than income at the time of the
divorce where a party Ahas experienced a temporary decrease in income,'" (quoting Olson v. Olson ,
704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985)).
The instant case, however, does not present a situation where a trial court may use Appellant's
historical average as a measure of Appellant's ability to provide support. The case law is clear that
historical income may only be used when the payor spouse experiences a temporary decrease in
income. In the instant case, witnesses for the Appellant presented extensive evidence that Appellant's
decrease in income was permanent. As mentioned above, witnesses isolated several causes for the
decrease in income ranging from changes in health care management to market saturation. No
evidence was presented at trial to suggest these causes were temporary in nature. Rather, these causes
will permanently affect Appellant's income.
In the Findings of Fact, the trial court appears to accept the premise that Appellant's earnings
have decreased permanently. In paragraph 32, the Court states, "The Court finds that it is likely
Defendant's income will be lower in 1996 and thereafter than the four year average determined by the
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Court," (emphasis added). Hence, the Court accepts that the causes leading to the decline in income
will continue to exist beyond a temporary time period. Since the decline is not temporary, the Court
may not use any evidence of historical income but must instead rely on evidence of current income.
Mr. Dorigatti presented evidence that Appellant's current income amounted to $330,631.00.
(R. At 254). Witnesses for Appellee chose not to present evidence regarding Appellant's 1996
income. (R. At 108). Since current income and ability to pay are inescapably connected, the trial
court committed error by awarding alimony based on the $460,903.00 amount as opposed to the
amount shown at trial to be Appellant's current income.
III. TRIAL COURTS FAILURE TO ENTER SUFFICIENT FINDINGS ON THE ISSUE
OF ALIMONY WARRANTS REVERSAL OF TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS.
In addition to considering the above listed factors, the trial court is required to enter sufficient
findings in the record. As the Court stated in Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah App.
1995), "The trial court is required to enter sufficient findings on the three enumerated factors, and we
will reverse if it fails to do so unless the relevant facts contained within the record are 'clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment,'" (quoting Howell
v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 1218 (Utah App. 1991)). Moreover, the Court must make factual findings
on the reasonableness of each need for which the receiving spouse claims to require support. Willev v.
Willev. 866 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1993). In the instant case, the trial court has failed to prepare
sufficient findings relative to the four factors enumerated by statute.
With regard to the issue of Appellant' s ability to provide support, the trial court expressly
found that Appellant earned $460,903.00 per year. The Court stated that it reached this amount by
taking the historical amount earned by Appellant in the four previous years and then subtracting ten
percent of this amount. This conclusory mention of how the Court arrived at its figure does not qualify
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as an "adequate factual finding on all material issues necessary to support an award of alimony."
Chamber v. Chambers. 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992). Neither does such a finding fit into the
exception as a fact which is clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of
judgment.
As detailed above, the clear weight of testimony offered at trial tended to show that Appellant
earned significantly less than $460,903.00. Absent a detailed finding outlining how the court arrived at
the ten percent figure, this finding cannot stand. This error in and of itself requires this Court to
reverse the finding of the trial court.

IV. THE ONLY EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT
APPELLEE SHOULD HAVE IMPUTED INCOME OF $2,500.00 PER MONTH FROM
THE TIME THE COURT ENTERS THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (7) describes the procedure to be used at trial to impute income to
a party. Said statute provides:
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount
imputed or a hearing is held and a finding is made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or
under-employed.
(7) (b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community.
In order to impute income to a party, the trial court must follow the guidelines enumerated in this
statute.
In the instant case, the only evidence before the Court on the amount of income to be imputed
to Appellee was undisputed. John Matthews, a labor economist employed by the State of Utah,
testified that a new teacher in Cache Valley earned $12.96 per hour or $29,299.00 per year. (R. At
21-23). Mr. Matthews also testified that there were currently fifty openings in the State of Utah for
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elementary and secondary level teachers. (R. At 23).
In light of these facts, Appellee testified that she could earn her teaching certificate in four
quarters. (R. At 360). Appellee also testified that during the hours between 8:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m.
that her children attended school and that she could do as she pleased during that time. (R. At 361).
Notwithstanding this testimony, however, Appellee admitted that she hadn' t taken steps to advance her
career training in the year and four months since her separation and the time of trial. (R. At 363).
Applying this unrefuted testimony to the relative statute shows that Appellee was voluntarily
unemployed and that Appellee could realistically expect to earn nearly $30,000.00 per year as a teacher
upon the completion of her teacher certificate. Had Appellee begun work toward the completion of
this certificate upon her separation, Appellee would have completed this certificate before the beginning
of trial. The statute is clear. Appellee does not have the option of staying home or accepting a lower
paying job; she must take steps to support herself and her children.
V. TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING APPELLANT TO PAY AWARDED
ALIMONY RETROACTIVE TO TIME OF TRIAL.
Under Utah law, a judgment does not become enforceable until such judgment is signed and
filed with the clerk of the court. Rule 58(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Wisdon v. Salina. 696
P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985); Pate v. Marathon Steel Co.. 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984). Further, this Court
has stated, "Once temporary support obligations become due, they are no more retroactively modifiable
than final decrees." Whitehead v. Whitehead. 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah App. 1992).
The State of Utah has long recognized the authority of the parties to make agreements
concerning the monetary terms of a divorce, and absent a showing of fraud, hardship, duress,
concealment, or mutual mistake, the court may not retroactively upset such an agreement. Wallis v.
WalUs, 342 P.2d 103 (Utah 1959); Shelton v. Shelton, 885 P.2d 807 (Utah App. 1994). In the instant
case, the parties reached a stipulation on April 21, 1995. Pursuant to the terms of this stipulation, the
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parties agreed that Appellant would pay the sum of $6,500.00 per month as temporary alimony.
Appellant paid this amount from April, 1995, until June 1997 (the date the final decree of divorce was
signed and entered in the record).
In the Divorce Decree, signed June 3, 1997, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay $10,
515.00 per month as and for alimony commencing May 1, 1996. This order constitutes an abuse of
discretion. Once Appellant makes the payments as the payments become due, they become unalterable
debts which cannot be changed or modified thereafter. Whitehead, at 816; Shelton, at 808; Larsen v.
Larsen. 561 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Utah 1977). Had the Court wished to modify the stipulation, the Court
could have ordered a prospective modification to govern the interim period between trial and the
entering of judgment. Karen v. State Dept. of Social Serve.. 716 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah 1986). The
Court, however, failed to make such an order.
On these facts, the Court simply cannot award retroactive alimony. Each of the payments was
paid in a timely manner prior to the entry of judgment. The Court' s order amounts to an abuse of
discretion which this Court must reverse.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Appellant hereby moves this Court to reverse the trial court's award of
alimony in favor of an award commensurate with the facts presented at trial and Utah Law.
Dated this 5th day of March, 1998.
SKEEN & ROBINSON, L.L.C.

Randall L. Skeen,
Shiiwn H. Robinson,
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of SKEEN & ROBINSON,
L.L.C. 3760 So. Highland Drive, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, UT 84106, and that in said capacity the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was served upon the Appellee by mailing via first-class mail,
postage prepaid, two true aitd correct copies thereof to the following this 5th day of March, 1998:
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Suite 722, Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Stephen W. Jewell, 3814
Attorney for Plaintiff
15 South Main, Third Floor
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801)753-2000

RECEIVED
JUN2 7 1997

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KIM LARSON,

FINAL
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 954-08 IDA
BRAD LARSON,
Judge Clint S. Judkins
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for trial on May 2 - 3 , 1996, the Honorable Clint
S. Judkins, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff appeared in person and with her
attorney, Stephen W. Jewell. Defendant appeared in person and with his attorney, Kenneth
A. Okazaki, PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER. The Court having received and
accepted certain stipulations of the parties and having heard and received testimony and
evidence, and all other kindred matters having been resolved and the Court having examined
the evidence and being fully advised in the premises after subsequent hearings, arguments
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of counsel and the submission of memoranda, and having previously entered a Decree of
Divorce dated June 12, 1996, intended as a temporary Decree of Divorce until the resolution
of all issues, those issues having been ruled upon by the Court, and having previously
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following
Decree:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1. The Court reaffirms the Decree of Divorce entered in this action, the same to be
final as of June 12, 1996.
CUSTODY AND VISITATION
2.

The parties shall be and are hereby granted joint legal and physical custody of

the minor children of the parties, to wit: Krista Larson, bom July 4, 1982; and Gregory
Larson, born November 20, 1986. Plaintiff is awarded seventy-five percent (75%) of the
custodial time and Defendant is awarded twenty-five percent (25%) of the custodial time
with said minor children. Custodial exchanges will continue on the current schedule, with
Defendant to have the children ever}* Tuesday overnight and every other weekend, unless as
otherwise agreed between the parties. All other custodial time, unless otherwise agreed
between the parties, will be pursuant to the Utah Statutory Visitation Guidelines, Section 303-33, Utah Code, including four (4) consecutive weeks during the summer. Visitation shall
otherwise be as follows:
A.

In years ending in an odd number, the father, (Defendant)
is entitled to the following holidays:
2

B.

(1)

Day before or after child(ren)'s actual birthday beginning
at 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.;

(2)

Human Rights Day beginning 6:00 p.m. the day before
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;

(3)

Easter holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until
Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant)
is completely entitled;

(4)

Memorial Day beginning 6:00 p.m. on Friday until
Monday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant)
is completely entitled;

(5)

July 24th beginning 6:00 p.m. on the day before the
holiday until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday;

(6)

Veteran's day holiday beginning 6:00 p.m. the day
before the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and

(7)

The first portion of the Christmas school vacation** as
defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve
and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m., so long as the entire
holiday is equally divided;

In years ending in an even number, the father (Defendant)
is entitled to the following holidays:
(1)

Child(ren)'s birthday on actual birth date beginning at
3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.;

(2)

New Year's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;

(3)

President's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;
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(4)

July 4th beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the
holiday until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday;

(5)

Labor Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until
Monday at 7:00 p.m. unless the holiday extends for
lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant)
is completely entitled;

(6)

The fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as
U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m. unless the holiday extends for
a lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant)
is completely entitled;

(7)

Columbus Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;

(8)

Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7:00 p.m.
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and

(9)

The second portion of the Christmas school vacation**
as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas
day beginning at 1:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., as long as the
entire Christmas holiday is equally divided;

C.

Father's Day shall be spent with the father every year beginning
at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;

D.

Mother's Day shall be spent with the mother every year
beginning at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;

E.

Extended visitation with the father (Defendant) may be:
(1)

Up to four (4) weeks consecutive at the option of the
father (Defendant);

(2)

Two (2) weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the
noncustodial parent father (Defendant); and
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(3)

The remaining two (2) weeks shall be subject to
visitation for the custodial parent mother (Plaintiff)
consistent with these guidelines;

F.

The mother (Plaintiff) shall have an identical two (2) week
period of uninterrupted time during the child(ren)'s summer
vacation from school for purposes of vacation;

G.

If the child(ren) is/are enrolled in year-round school, the father's
(Defendant) extended visitation shall be one-half (14) of the
vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the mother
(Plaintiff) has holiday and telephone visits;

H.

Notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the
child(ren) shall be provided at least thirty (30) days in advance
to the other parent:

I.

Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and
changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the
alternating
weekend visitation schedule;
*£>

J.

If a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the father
(Defendant) shall be responsible for the child(ren)'s attendance
at school for that school day;

K.

If a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and
the total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the
child(ren) is/are free from school and the parent is free from
work, the father (Defendant) shall be entitled to this lengthier
holiday period;

L.

Telephone contact at reasonable hours; and

M.

Such other times as agreed between the parties.

**"Christmas school vacation" means the time period beginning on the
evening the child gets out of school for the Christmas school break until the
evening before the child returns to school, except for Christmas Eve,
Christmas Day, and New Year's Day.

D

"Extended visitation" means a period of visitation other than a weekend,
holiday as provided in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), religious holidays
as provided in Subsections 30-3-33(4) and (16), and i;Christmas school
vacation.
The parties shall further comply with the following:
Keep each other advised of their current address and telephone number within
twenty four (24) hours of any change;
Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child(ren)
available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family
reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant
events in the life of the child(ren) or in the life of either parent which may
inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule;
The father (Defendant) shall pick up the child(ren) at the time specified and
return the child(ren) at the time specified, and the child(ren)'s regular school
hours shall not be interrupted;
The mother (Plaintiff) shall notify the father (Defendant) within twenty-four
(24) hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports, and
community function in which the child(ren) is/are participating or being
honored, and the father (Defendant) shall be entitled to attend and participate
folly;
The father (Defendant) shall have access directly to all school reports
including preschool and day care reports and medical records and shall be
notified immediately by the mother (Plaintiff) in the event of a medical
emergency;
Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child(ren) than
surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in
allowing the father (Defendant), if willing and able, to provide child care;
Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays
celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday
that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with
the child(ren) on the religious holiday.
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Refrain from making derogatory remarks about or to the other in the presence
of the minor children.
CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD CARE
3.

Child support shall be and is hereby ordered at $1,400.00 per month for the

parties' two (2) minor children, less a credit for one-half of the insurance premium as
provided in Paragraph 7.
4.

Said child support payments shall be and are hereby due one-half (14) on or

before the fifth (5th) day and one-half (14) on or before the twentieth (20th) day of each
month commencing May 1, 1996, and continuing every month thereafter until each child
reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school through normal matriculation,
whichever is later. Upon Defendant's child support obligation for Krista being terminated,
child support shall be automatically rescheduled using the maximum child support amount
for one (1) child.
5.

Child support payments may be made directly to Plaintiff. If Defendant

becomes delinquent in payment of support, said payments shall then be paid through
automatic income withholding through the Utah State Department of Human Services, Office
of Recovery Services by serving an Order to Withhold and Deliver. In accordance with Utah
Code Annotated § 62A-1 l-403(2)(b) and 78-45-7(4), the Defendant will then be assessed an
additional check processing fee in the amount of S7.00, or such other amount as required by
statute. This fee shall be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery
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Services. As an alternative to automatic income withholding, Defendant may pay support
by wage assignment and/or direct deposit to Plaintiffs checking account.
6.

Child support shall be abated by one-half QA) during summer visitation as long

as the children are with Defendant for at least twenty-five (25) of thirty (30) consecutive
days.
HEALTH INSURANCE
7.

That Defendant shall provide health insurance for said minor children if

insurance is available at a reasonable cost. Each party should pay one-half (14) of the
uninsured medical and dental expenses for the children. Medical coverage should include
all regular health and medical care, eye care, psychological care, dental and orthodontic
work. Reimbursement shall be made by the other party within thirty (30) days of receipt of
such verification.
LTFE INSURANCE
8.

Each part}' shall be and is hereby awarded their present life insurance policies

on themselves. The Court makes no order regarding maintaining insurance on behalf of the
children.
DIVISION OF PROPERTY
9.

The Plaintiff shall be and is hereby awarded the parties1 home and real property

located at 240 North 1480 East, Logan, Utah, valued at $520,000.00 with an equity of
5245,506.00, free and clear of any interest of Defendant. Defendant shall immediately
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execute a Quit Claim Deed in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall be responsible for the
mortgage, taxes, insurance and any other costs or assessments related to said property.
10.

The Defendant is shall be and is hereby awarded the home and real property

with improvements at 745 East Foxridge, Providence, Utah, with an equity value of
$105,600.00, free and clear of any interest of Plaintiff. Defendant shall be responsible for
the mortgage, taxes, insurance and any other costs or assessment related to said property.
11.

Plaintiff shall return to Defendant his own personal genealogy and the figurines

from his grandmother. The parties will also find a convenient time for Defendant to review
family pictures and make copies of any family pictures requested by Defendant. Plaintiff
shall make those pictures available for copying at Defendant's expense. Defendant will be
responsible for returning all pictures to Plaintiff as quickly as possible.
12.

Plaintiff shall be and is hereby awarded the furniture and furnishings in her

possession at a value of $50,000.00.
13.

Defendant shall be and is hereby awarded the furniture and furnishings in his

possession,, including the stereo, books, office and computer, valued at $16,000.00.
14.

Defendant shall be and is hereby awarded the four-wheeler with blade, valued

at $3,000.00.
15.

Plaintiff shall be and is hereby awarded the Suburban valued at $28,500.00.

16.

Defendant shall be and is hereby awarded the Blazer valued at $24,000.00.
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17.

Plaintiff shall be and is hereby awarded the Central Life and two (2) Jackson

National Policies identified hereinafter.
18.

Defendant shall be and is hereby awarded the five (5) Jackson National

Policies, Central Life Policy, Lord Abbot IRA, IDEX 401(K), Oppenheimer and ATEL
Account as stated hereinafter.
19.

The Court does not establish the value on the VEBA and hereby awards one-

half (14) of the VEBA to each party to be distributed pursuant to a qualified domestic
relations order. However, the Court will allow Defendant, at his sole discretion, to otherwise
liquidate the VEBA, providing notice to Plaintiff of any such liquidation. Defendant shall
immediately pay one-half (14) of any net proceeds realized from the VEBA to Plaintiff, if it
is liquidated.
20.

The Court further hereby awards one-half (!/>) of the RANCON Investment to

each of the parties. The Genesis Family Limited Partnership shall be and is hereby awarded
as follows: Fifty percent (50%) each party. However, the Court creates a voting right and
awards that.right to Defendant so that he has voting rights of all four shares. Plaintiff has an
economic one-half interest, but Defendant has the right to control the partnership.2 1
The Court, therefore, hereby awards the property and values as follows:
To Plaintiff:
ASSET

VALUES

Logan home

$ 245,506.00

Furnishings in Logan home

50,000.00
10

1,593.00

Central Life
Jackson National

324.00

Jackson National

292.00
28,500.00

Suburban (Trade/Pontiac)
One-half ('/2)VEB A

N/A

One-half (l/2)RANCON

N/A

One-half (!/2) General Partnership, Genesis

N/A

S 326,215.00

TOTAL:

To Defendant:
VALUES

ASSET

105,600.00

Providence home
Furnishings in Providence home

16,000.00
3,000.00

Four-wheeler with blade

24,000.00

Blazer
Jackson National

2,340.00

Jackson National

6,213.00

Jackson National

2,009.00
1,991.00

Jackson National
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Jackson National

2,575.00

Central Life

18,481.00

Lord Abbot

6,590.00

IDEX

8,061.00

Oppenheimer

2,229.00
22,380.00

ATEL
One-half ('/2)VEBA

N/A

One-half ('/2) RANCON

N/A

One-half C/2) General Partnership, Genesis

N/A

TOTAL

S 221,469.00

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS
22.

Each party shall assume and pay the mortgage associated with the property

awarded to each party, holding the other harmless therefrom.
23.

Defendant shall assume and be responsible for the credit card debt with MBNA

atSll,161.00.
24.

Each party shall be responsible for all individual and personal debts and

obligations incurred since the parties' separation on or about February 1, 1995, holding the
other part}' harmless therefrom.
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EQUALIZATION OF MARITAL ESTATE
25.

As of June 1, 1997, Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant the balance of the amount

due on the property division of 57,058.50 (as provided in Paragraphs 27 and 28 of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law), to be paid by allowing Defendant to deduct up
to SI.000.00 per month for alimony until said 57,058.50 is paid and satisfied.
ALIMONY
26.

Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff 510,515.00 per month as and for alimony

commencing May 1, 1996.
27.

Commencing May 1, 1998, alimony shall be automatically reduced by

51,500.00 per month.
28.

Alimony shall continue until the death of either party, Plaintiffs remarriage

or cohabitation, or as otherwise provided by statute or order of the Court.
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
29.

Each party shall pay his or her own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this

matter.
DATED this 6

day of J w ^ _ _ , 1997.
BY THE COURT:

/S/ CL!i\T 3. JUrx<i>J3
Clint S. Judkins
District Court Judse
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the .C&VTV day of May, 1997,1 mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE, to the following person(s), postage prepaid thereon, by depositing in the U.S. Mail.
Kenneth A. Okazaki
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

NOTICE
You will please take notice that the above entitled document will be presented by the
clerk to the assigned commissioner and/or judge for his signature upon the expiration of five
(5) days frorii the date of this Notice, pius three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection
is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration.
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Stephen W.Jewell, 3814
Attorney for Plaintiff
15 South Main, Third Floor
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801)753-2000
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KIM LARSON,

FINAL
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 954-08 IDA

BRAD LARSON,
Judge Clint S. Judkins
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for trial on May 2 - 3 , 1996, the Honorable Clint
S. Judkins, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff appeared in person and with her
attorney, Stephen W. Jewell. Defendant appeared in person and with his attorney, Kenneth
A. Okazaki, PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER. The Court having received and
accepted certain stipulations of the parties and having heard and received testimony and

1

evidence, and all other kindred matters having been resolved and the Court having examined
the evidence and being fully advised in the premises after subsequent hearings, arguments
of counsel and the submission of memoranda, and having previously entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law dated June 12, 1996, intended as temporary Findings and
Conclusions until the resolution of all issues, those issues having been ruled upon by the
Court, now makes and enters the following:
FINAL
FINDINGS OF FACT
JURISDICTION
1.

That the Plaintiff is now and has been for three (3) months immediately

preceding the filing of this action, a resident of Cache County, State of Utah.
2.

That Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each other on the 19th day of

March, 1975, in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
GROUNDS
3.

That there have arisen irreconcilable differences of the marriage between

Plaintiff and Defendant. The parties have attempted reconciliation of their differences, but
are unable to continue the marriage.
CUSTODY AND VISITATION
4.

The parties shall be granted joint legal and physical custody of the minor

children of the parties, to wit: Krista Larson, born July 4, 1982; and Gregory Larson, bom
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November 20, 1986. Plaintiff is awarded seventy-five percent (75%) of the custodial time
and Defendant is awarded twenty-five percent (25%) of the custodial time with said minor
children. Custodial exchanges will continue on the current schedule, with Defendant to have
the children every Tuesday overnight and every other weekend, unless as otherwise agreed
between the parties. All other custodial time, unless otherwise agreed, will be pursuant to
the Utah Statutory Visitation Guidelines, Section 30-3-33, Utah Code, including four (4)
consecutive weeks during the summer. Visitation shall otherwise be as follows:

A.

In years ending in an odd number, the father, (Defendant)
is entitled to the following holidays:

(1)

Day before or after child(ren)'s actual birthday beginning
at 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.;

(2)

Human Rights Day beginning 6:00 p.m. the day before
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;

(3)

Easter holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until
Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant)
is completely entitled;

(4)

Memorial Day beginning 6:00 p.m. on Friday until
Monday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant)
is completely entitled;

(5)

July 24th beginning 6:00 p.m. on the day before the
holiday until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday;
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(6)

Veteran's day holiday beginning 6:00 p.m. the day
before the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and

(7)

The first portion of the Christmas school vacation** as
defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve
and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m., so long as the entire
holiday is equally divided;

In years ending in an even number, the father (Defend
is entitled to the following holidays:
(1)

Child(ren)'s birthday on actual birth date beginning at
3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.;

(2)

New Year's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;

(3)

President's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;

(4)

July 4th beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the
holiday until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday;

(5)

Labor Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until
Monday at 7:00 p.m. unless the holiday extends for
lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant)
is completely entitled;

(6)

The fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as
U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m. unless the holiday extends for
a lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant)
is completely entitled;

(7)

Columbus Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;

(8)

Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7:00 p.m.
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and
4

(9)

The second portion of the Christmas school vacation**
as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas
day beginning at 1:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., as long as the
entire Christmas holiday is equally divided;

C.

Father's Day shall be spent with the father every year beginning
at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;

D.

Mother's Day shall be spent with the mother every year
beginning at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;

E.

Extended visitation with the father (Defendant) may be:
(1)

Up to four (4) weeks consecutive at the option of the
father (Defendant);

(2)

Two (2) weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the
noncustodial parent father (Defendant); and

(3)

The remaining two (2) weeks shall be subject to
visitation for the custodial parent mother (Plaintiff)
consistent with these guidelines;

F.

The mother (Plaintiff) shall have an identical two (2) week
period of uninterrupted time during the child(ren)'s summer
vacation from school for purposes of vacation;

G.

If the child(ren) is/are enrolled in year-round school, the father's
(Defendant) extended visitation shall be one-half (14) of the
vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the mother
(Plaintiff) has holiday and telephone visits;

H.

Notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the
child(ren) shall be provided at least thirty (30) days in advance
to the other parent;

I.

Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and
changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the
alternating weekend visitation schedule;
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J.

If a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the father
(Defendant) shall be responsible for the child(ren)'s attendance
at school for that school day;

K.

If a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and
the total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the
child(ren) is/are free from school and the parent is free from
work, the father (Defendant) shall be entitled to this lengthier
holiday period;

L.

Telephone contact at reasonable hours; and

M.

Such other times as agreed between the parties.

**"Christmas school vacation" means the time period beginning on the
evening the child sets out of school for the Christmas school break until the
evening before the child returns to school, except for Christmas Eve,
Christmas Day, and New Year's Day.
"Extended visitation" means a period of visitation other than a weekend,
holiday as provided in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), religious holidays
as provided in Subsections 30-3-33(4) and (16), and ''Christmas school
vacation.
The parties shall further comply with the following:
Keep each other advised of their current address and telephone number within
twenty four (24) hours of any change;
Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child(ren)
available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family
reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant
events in the life of the child(ren) or in the life of either parent which may
inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule;
The father (Defendant) shall pick up the child(ren) at the time specified and
return the child(ren) at the time specified, and the child(ren)'s regular school
hours shall not be interrupted;
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The mother (Plaintiff) shall notify the father (Defendant) within twenty-four
(24) hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports, and
community function in which the child(ren) is/are participating or being
honored, and the father (Defendant) shall be entitled to attend and participate
fully;

The father (Defendant) shall have access directly to all school reports
including preschool and day care reports and medical records and shall be
notified immediately by the mother (Plaintiff) in the event of a medical
emergency;
Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child(ren) than
surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in
allowing the father (Defendant), if willing and able, to provide child care;
Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays
celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday
that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with
the child(ren) on the religious holiday.
Refrain from making derogatory remarks about or to the other in the presence
of the minor children.

CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD CARE
5.

For purposes of child support, the Court is going to use the maximum amount

for two (2) children as stated on the current Uniform Child Support Guidelines. The Court
finds that Defendant's income substantially exceeds the maximum on the schedule and that
the needs of the children fall below the maximum of the schedule. The Court does not
impute any income to Plaintiff for child support purposes. Therefore, for two (2) children,
the child support shall be $1,400.00 per month as set forth in the Child Support Obligation
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Worksheet (Sole Custody), which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference,
less a credit for one-half Q/2) of the insurance premium as provided in Paragraph 9. (The
parties stipulated that the Court use a sole custody worksheet in determining child support.)
6.

Said child support payments shall be due one-half (14) on or before the fifth

(5th) day and one-half QA) on or before the twentieth (20th) day of each month commencing
May 1, 1996, and continuing every month thereafter until each child reaches the age of
eighteen (18) or graduates from high school through normal matriculation, whichever is later.
Upon Defendant's child support obligation for Krista being terminated, child support shall
be automatically rescheduled using the maximum child support amount for one (1) child.
7.

Child support payments may be made directly to Plaintiff. If Defendant

becomes delinquent in payment of support, said payments shall then be paid through
automatic income withholding through the Utah State Department of Human Services. Office
of Recovery Services by serving an Order to Withhold and Deliver. In accordance w;ith Utah
Code Annotated § 62A-1 l-403(2)(b) and 78-45-7(4), the Defendant will then be assessed an
additional check processing fee in the amount of $7.00, or such other amount as required by
statute. This fee shall be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery
Services. As an alternative to automatic income withholding, Defendant may pay support
by wage assignment and/or direct deposit to Plaintiffs checking account.
8.

Child support shall be abated by one-half (I/2) during summer visitation as long

as the children are with Defendant for at least twenty-five (25) of thirty (30) consecutive
8

days.
HEALTH INSURANCE
9.

That Defendant should provide health insurance for said minor childrei(tf

insurance is available at a reasonable cos^\ Each party should pay one-half (!/2) of the
uninsured medical and dental expenses for the children. Medical coverage should include
all regular health and medical care, eye cam* psychological care, dental and orthodontic
work. A party who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost
and payment of medical expenses to the other party within thirty (30) days of payment.
Reimbursement shall be made by the other party within thirty (30) days of receipt of such
verification.
IJFE INSURANCE
10.

Each party shall be awarded their present life insurance policies on themselves.

The Court makes no order regarding maintaining insurance on behalf of the children.
DIVISION OF PROPERTY
11.

The Plaintiff shall be awarded the parties' home and real property located at

240 North 1480 East, Logan, Utah, valued at $520,000.00 with an equity of $245,506.00,
free and clear of any interest of Defendant. Defendant shall immediately execute a Quit
Claim Deed in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall be responsible for the mortgage, taxes,
insurance and any other costs or assessments related to said property.
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12.

The Defendant is awarded the home and real property with improvements at

745 East Foxridge, Providence, Utah, with an equity value of $105,600.00, free and clear of
any interest of Plaintiff. Defendant shall be responsible for the mortgage, taxes, insurance
and any other costs or assessment related to said property.
13.

Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties, the Court finds that Plaintiff should

return to Defendant his own personal genealogy and the figurines from his grandmother. The
parties will also find a convenient time for Defendant to review family pictures and make
copies of any family pictures requested by Defendant. Plaintiff shall make those pictures
available for copying at Defendant's expense. Defendant will be responsible for returning
all pictures to Plaintiff as quickly as possible.
14.

Plaintiff is awarded the furniture and furnishings in her possession at a value

of$50,000.00.
15.

Defendant is awarded the furniture and furnishings in his possession, including

the stereo, books, office and computer, valued at $16,000.00.
16.

Defendant is awarded the four-wheeler with blade, valued at $3,000.00.

17.

Plaintiff is awarded the Suburban valued at $28,500.00 as appraised by

Thomas Axtell.
18.

Defendant is awarded the Blazer valued at $24,000.00 as appraised by Thomas

Axtell.
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19.

Plaintiff is awarded the Central Life and two (2) Jackson National Policies

identified hereinafter.
20.

Defendant is awarded the five (5) Jackson National Policies, Central Life

Policy, Lord Abbot IRA, IDEX 401(K), Oppenheimer and ATEL Account as stated
hereinafter.
21.

The Court does not establish the value on the VEBA and awards one-half (!4)

of the VEBA to each party to be distributed pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order.
However, based on the testimony of the value of the VEBA, the Court will allow Defendant,
at his sole discretion, to otherwise liquidate the VEBA, providing notice to Plaintiff of any
such liquidation. Defendant shall immediately pay one-half (!4) of any net proceeds realized
from the VEBA to Plaintiff, if it is liquidated.
22.

The Court further awards one-half (14) of the RANCON Investment to each of

the parties. The Genesis Family Limited Partnership should be awarded as follows: Fifty
percent (50%) each party. However, the Court creates a voting right and awardsithatright
te-©efendantso that he has voting rights of all four shares. Plaintiff has an economic onehalf interest, but Defendant has the right to control the partnership.
23.

The Court, therefore, awards the property and values as follows:
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To Plaintiff:
ASSET

VALUES

Logan home
Furnishings in Logan home
Central Life
Jackson National
Jackson National
Suburban (Trade/Pontiac)
One-half (!/2)VEBA
One-half (!/2)RANCON
One-half (!/2) General Partnership, Genesis

$ 245,506.00
50,000.00
1,593.00
324.00
292.00
28,500.00
N/A
N/A
N/A

TOTAL:

S 326,215.00

To Defendant:

ASSET

VALUES

Providence home
Furnishings in Providence home
Four-wheeler with blade
Blazer
Jackson National
Jackson National
Jackson National
Jackson National
Jackson National
Central Life
Lord Abbot
IDEX
Oppenheimer
ATEL
One-half (!/2)VEB A
One-half (!£) RANCON
12

$

105,600.00
16,000.00
3,000.00
24,000.00
2,340.00
6,213.00
2,009.00
1,991.00
2,575.00
18,481.00
6,590.00
8,061.00
2,229.00
22,380.00
N/A
N/A

One-half (14) General Partnership, Genesis
TOTAL

N/A
$ 221,469.00

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS
24.

Each party shall assume and pay the mortgage associated with the property

awarded to each party, holding the other harmless therefrom.
25.

Defendant should pay and be liable for the MBNA Master Card Charge in the

amount of $11,161.00. The Court finds that even though the MBNA Master Card debt has
been paid partially by Plaintiff, the Court has considered that fact and confirms that
Defendant should pay the balance of the MBNA Master Card.
26.

Each party should be responsible for all individual and personal debts and

obligations incurred since the parties' separation on or about February 1, 1995, holding the
other party harmless therefrom.
EQUALIZATION OF MARITAL ESTATE
27.

The Court finds the difference between the property awarded to Plaintiff and

the property and debt awarded to Defendant to be $115,907.00. To equalize the division of
property between the parties, the Court finds that it is necessary for Plaintiff to pay to
Defendant $57,953.50.
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28.

In order to satisfy the amount awarded to Defendant to equalize the property

distribution, the Court will deduct therefrom the difference of the alimony and child support
awarded by the Court as provided in Paragraphs 38 and 39 from the alimony and child
support actually paid to Plaintiff. As of June 1, 1997, the balance of the amount due on the
property division, or $7,058.50, as provided in Paragraph 39, shall be paid by allowing
Defendant to deduct up to $1,000.00 per month until that amount is paid and satisfied. The
deduction of $3,915.00 per month which have accumulated for thirteen (13) months (May
1996 through May. 1997), as well as the ongoing deduction of $1,000.00 per month until the
balance of the property division is satisfied are clarified to be alimony to be treated as such
by the parties for tax purposes.
ALIMONY
29.

The Court finds that Defendant's average income for the past four (4) years

(i.e., 1992 through 1995), is $512,114.00 after deducting reasonable and necessary business
expenses. The Court did not add back the VEBA or other amounts.
30.

The Court did not include in the four (4) year average the income for the first

four (4) months of January through April, 1996. The Court finds that a four (4) month
duration is too short a time to determine any reliability, that it is not reflective of Defendant's
actual income, and that a four (4) year average is more appropriate to determine current
income.
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31.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs current ability to earn an income is

approximately $1,000.00 per month. The Courtfindsthat there was testimony that Plaintiff
could obtain a teaching certificate in four (4) quarters, or approximately one (1) year, but the
Court believes realistically it would take approximately two (2) years for Plaintiff to obtain
a teaching certificate. The Court further finds that Plaintiff is capable and will qualify as a
teacher and that there was testimony that the average salary for teachers in Cache County is
approximately $29,000.00 a year.
32.

The Courtfindsthat it is likely Defendant's income will be lower in 1996 and

thereafter than the four (4) year average determined by the Court. The Court finds that ten
percent (10%) is an appropriate amount to reduce the average income, which is
approximately $51,211.00. The Court, therefore, finds that Defendant's current income is
$460,903.00 per year or $38,408.00 per month.
33.

To determine alimony, the Courtfindsthat Defendant will pay approximately

forty-eight and twenty-five one hundredths percent (48.25%) of his income in federal and
state income taxes, or $18,531.00 per month. The Court will deduct that amount from
Defendant's monthly income to derive a net monthly income, after taxes, of $19,876.00.
34.

If the Court were to deduct child support of $1,400.00 and Plaintiffs income

of $1,000.00 in order to determine a difference in incomes and then equalize that income,
the difference between the parties' incomes would be $17,478.00 and the equalized income
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would be $8,738.00.
35.

However, upon considering the tax consequences as argued by the parties, the

Court finds that the actual cost of alimony paid by Defendant is sixty percent (60%) of the
projected amount of $8,738.00, realizing a tax savings to Defendant of $3,496.00. Adding
the tax savings back in to the projected alimony would equal $12,734.00 [sic] (November
15, 1996 Hearing, p. 34 1.20).
36.

The Court further finds that Plaintiffs projected tax consequences are

approximately seventeen percent (17%) of her income. The amount of taxes Plaintiff would
pay on the projected alimony of $8,738.00 would be $1,485.00, reducing the net projected
alimony to $7,253.00. Adding Plaintiffs imputed income of $1,000.00 would realize net
income to Plaintiff of $8,253.00. Including the child support award of $1,400.00 would
increase the net income to Plaintiff to $9,653.00.
37.

If the Court were to then equalize the net incomes, the Court would order

Defendant to pay an additional $2,240.00, for a total of $10,978.00. [sic] (November 15,
1996 Hearing, p. 35, 1.10-12). The Court, therefore, establishes and reaffirms alimony to
Plaintiff at $10,515.00 per month as stated in the Court's ruling on May 7, 1996. (November
15, 1996 Hearing, p. 36, 1.8-10).
38.

Although the Court initially determined that alimony should be paid retroactive

to April 1, 1995, upon further consideration and argument from the parties, the Court finds
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that the permanent award of alimony should commence as of the date of trial, or May 3,
1996. However, since Defendant has been allowed to continue paying alimony at the
temporary level of $6,600.00 per month, the difference, or $3,915.00 per month shall be
credited toward the $57,553.50 owed to Defendant to equalize the division of the marital
estate as determined by the Court.
39.

Alimony shall commence at the permanent level of $10,515.00 on June 1,

1997. Therefore, thirteen (13) months at $3,915.00 per month, or $50,895.00, shall be
subtracted from the amount owed to Defendant of $57,953.50, leaving a total net amount
owing to Defendant as of June 1, 1997, of $7,058.50. That amount can be paid to Plaintiff
by Defendant deducting $1,000.00 per month from ongoing alimony payments, commencing
June 1, 1997, until satisfied.
40.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs monthly expenses as provided in Plaintiffs

Exhibit No. 5, not including savings, retirement or tithing; equal approximately $10,462.00
and that Defendant's monthly expenses as provided in Defendant's Exhibit No. 16, not
including expenses for Tim or tithing, equal approximately $4,340.00. However, the Court
finds that there is substantial income in excess of the needs of the parties contrary to most,
divorce actions, and not only bases the alimony award on the stated needs, but in adjusting
the available income between the parties.
41.

Based on the Court's finding that Plaintiff should be able to earn an income
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of approximately $2,500.00 per month commencing approximately May 1, 1998, the Court
finds that alimony should be reduced by $1,500.00 per month effective May 1, 1998.
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
42.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs attorney's fees are reasonable and necessarily

incurred in this matter. However, based on the alimony award, the Court finds that each
party has the ability to pay his or her own attorney's fees and does not award attorney's fees.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law previously entered by the Court

on or about June 12, 1996 are hereby reaffirmed.
2.

Each party should be awarded the property and debts as indicated in the

Findings of Fact.
3.

That Defendant should be ordered to pay alimony and child support in the

amount as stated in the Findings of Fact and for the reasons stated therein.
4.

That the parties are entitled to a Decree entered in accordance with all of the

Findings of Fact as stated hereinabove.
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DATED this

day of

, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

Clint S. Judkins
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the <Q3*A day of May, 1997,1 mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, to the
following person(s), postage pre-paid thereon, by depositing in the U.S. Mail.
Kenneth A. Okazaki
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

~ — y v v r L . ~ . Xr .
Sharon McCormick
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NOTICE
You will please take notice that the above entitled document will be presented by the
clerk to the assigned commissioner and/or judge for his signature upon the expiration of five
(5) daysfromthe date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection
is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration.
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KIM LARSON,
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY)

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 954-081

BRAD LARSON,
Defendant.

MOTHER

FATHER

1. Enter the # of Natural and Adopted Children of this Mother
and Father for Whom Support Is to Be Awarded.

III III IIII III
II III
IIIIIIII

/////////////

2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income.
Refer to Instructions for definition of income.

$

2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (Do
not enter alimony ordered for this case).

-

-

II nun II

2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter
obligations ordered for the children in Line 1).

-

-

1 m mm/

2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the
Children in Present Home Worksheet for either parent

-

3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted
Gross Income fro child support purposes.

$

4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of
children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Base
Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here.

/////////////
/////////////
/////////////

$ 38,408.00

-0-

-0-

iiiii/mi
iiiiiiini

$

$ 38,408.00

100

(X ) Manual Filing

llllllllll
llllllllll J

%

$ 1,400.00

1

( ) No

llllllllll
llllllllll

1

$ 1,400.00

( X ) Father

( ) Electronic filing

J

/////////////
$ 1,400.00
/////////////
miiiiiiini
j

%

What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation?
( ) property settlement
( ) excessive debts of the marriage
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent
( ) Other:
;

Attorney Bar No. 3814

1

ini min

$ 38,408.00

-0-

Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in Line 7? ( X ) Yes
If NO, enter the amount ordered: $
, and answer number 10.
10.

2

1 IIIIIIUI
[llllllllll

-

7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6
for the Obligor Parent or enter the amount from the Low Income Table.
Which parent is the obligor? ( ) Mother

1

mum

iiiimm

5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by
the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each
parent's share of the Base Support Obligation.

III ii

COMBINED

j

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court ofAppeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony,
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and visitation — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5;
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances'are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage,
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, agross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if during the time prior to the
original support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than
40 hours at his job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training
Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance;
and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly
income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and
complete copies of tax returnsfromat least the most recent year unless the
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax
returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derivedfromwork history,
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal TniTiinniTn wage for a 40-hour work week, lb impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to
establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the

